Mechanisms for Corporate
Inaugural Lecture by
Nobel Laureate Professor Eric Maskin
Adams University Professor, Harvard University
Monday, 22 February 2016
6:30 - 7:30 pm
Large Moot Court, 2/F Cheng Yu Tung Tower
Centennial Campus, The University of Hong Kong
Most corporations make decisions according to “weighted majority rule” -- shareholders’ votes are weighted by the proportion of shares they hold, and the majority gets its way. One problem with this mechanism is that it cannot incorporate intensity of preference. In this lecture, Professor Maskin explores alternatives to weighted majority rule.
Professor Eric Maskin is Adams University Professor at Harvard and a member of the AIIFL Academic Advisory Board. He received the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics (with L. Hurwicz and R. Myerson) for laying the foundations of mechanism design theory. He also has made contributions to game theory, contract theory, social choice theory, political economy, and other areas of economics. He received his A.B. and PhD from Harvard and was a postdoctoral fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge University. He was a faculty member at MIT from 1977-1984, Harvard from 1985-2000, and the Institute for Advanced Study from 2000-2011. He rejoined the Harvard faculty in 2012.