Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Germany. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 1, 2026

Albert Chen and Ulrike Davy on Social rights thinking and the welfare state: The cases of Germany and China—Afterword to the Foreword by Nehal Bhuta (International Journal of Constitutional Law)

"Social rights thinking and the welfare state: The cases of Germany and China—Afterword to the Foreword by Nehal Bhuta"
Ulrike Davy, Albert Chen
International Journal of Constitutional Law
Published online: February 2026

Abstract: Our Afterword to Nehal Bhuta’s Foreword “Social rights and the origins of the social constitution: From collective natural rights to the social state” first addresses Bhuta’s account of developments in nineteenth-century German states (unified in 1871), in particular the writings of Lorenz von Stein and the activities of the Verein für Sozialpolitik (VfS). Second, it considers Bhuta’s Foreword from the perspective of social rights and social policies in the global South, using China as an example. Our Afterword suggests that in nineteenth-century Germany and twentieth-century China, the emergence of a state that accepts responsibility for individuals’ welfare was not necessarily preceded by, or a consequence of, social rights thinking. Instead, other rationales prevailed.

Friday, January 28, 2022

Alec Stone Sweet & Giacinto della Cananea in Conversation with Dieter Grimm, Justice of the German Federal Constitutional Court (1987 to 1999) (German LJ)

"A Conversation with Dieter Grimm (born in 1937, Justice of the German Federal Constitutional Court (1987 to 1999))"
Alec Stone Sweet and Giacinto della Cananea
German Law Journal (2021), 22, pp. 1541–1554
'A. Training and Academia
D. Grimm: There were no academics in my family; I was the first to attend university. At age 18, I was determined to go into politics, and I thought law was the best preparation for a political career...

E. Challenges, Past and Future
Questions: The development of the European courts, too, pose challenges to constitutional law.
There is now a widespread sensitivity to what is sometimes called “national constitutional identity.” The notion is today a legal construct, that gives a structure to inter-court dialogue, both cooperative or conflictual. The BVerfG, of course, has been at the forefront of these developments, from the Solange cases,15 to Görgülü,16 to the recent decision on the European Central Bank. Earlier, you stated that the ultimate issue is whether and when the BVerfG actually uses its powers to declare an EU act ultra vires. The issue has now been engaged, in the BVerfG’s ruling on the ECB, of May 2020.
Dieter: I expected it to happen at some point. Whether the PSPP case17 on the Bank was the best occasion is a different question. The Danish Supreme Court and Czech Constitutional Court did it earlier, but only the German Court’s refusal to follow the CJEU drew wide attention. It is a mistake to judge the ultra vires jurisprudence only from the viewpoint of the efficacy and unity of EU law. By definition, every European ultra vires act withdraws a subject matter from the domestic political process without authorization, thus limiting the range of the national constitution. The CJEU does not understand itself as protector of national democracy. It is also obvious that the Commission and the Council, too, can be the source of ultra vires acts, not just the CJEU. But the CJEU is extremely reluctant to declare European legal acts as ultra vires. consequently, the only safeguards of national democracy are the constitutional or highest courts of the member states.
Question: Looking forward, in the EU, national constitutional courts are now using the preliminary reference procedure more often. And in the ECHR, Protocol no. 16 now permits advisory opinions. Might these procedures help to structure more constructive dialogue among courts.
D. Grimm: That is indeed my hope.'  Click here to read the full conversation.

Friday, October 1, 2021

Guanghua Yu on The Rise of Germany in the 19th and 20th Centuries and Sustaining Democracy (Law and Development Review)

Guanghua Yu
Law and Development Review
Published in August 2021 online
Abstract: This article examines the rise of Germany from the nineteenth century to explain that it is open access in the economic sphere, as well as institutional building related to the protection of property rights, contract enforcement, financial markets, rule of law, and human resource accumulation that determine economic and human development. The case of Germany is not very consistent with the logic of the open access orders of North et al. or the theory of extractive political institutions of Acemoglu and Robinson along the line of contestation and inclusiveness. The case of Germany is, however, able to support the research of Przeworski and Limongi that economic development is more likely to sustain democracy. Germany is certainly not the only case in explaining that stable democracy is not the cause but rather the consequence or outcome of lengthy economic development. The historical evidence from South Korea and Taiwan similarly supports the position that democracy is the outcome of economic and political development. This article, however, does not examine whether western values of human equality and human freedom are essential in economic and human development. They are very likely to be so as human equality is the precondition of open access in the economic sphere and human freedom is closely integrated with the interconnected institutions examined in this article. Future research may investigate the roles of these values in different political systems regardless of whether a political system is under the rule of one party, by a dominant party, or through the utilization of a multiparty system.