Showing posts with label commentary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commentary. Show all posts

Thursday, June 23, 2022

Henry Litton Comments on Yeung Lai Ping v Secretary for Justice (CACV 206/2019)

Commentary on Yeung Lai Ping v Secretary for Justice (CACV 206/2019)
Henry Litton, Honorary Professor


HEALTH WARNING: Reading this article might arouse such sense of outrage it could damage your health, particularly for those suffering from high blood pressure.

Introduction
This is the story of a public health provider that cares neither for the welfare of its patients nor the health of its employees; and when an employee injured at work sought redress for harm done, the department deployed lawyers to crush her by the weight of black-letter law.

Background
Yeung Lai Ping (the plaintiff) qualified as a dentist when she was 23. She practised for about 4½ years, then resumed full-time studies, obtaining a Master of Dental Surgery degree when she was 30.
     In February 1997 she joined the Department of Health as a dental officer, and in the course of her practice performed a considerable number of surgical extractions (SX). This involved the removal of bone and cutting of teeth, operating in an awkward position and the use of some force. It also involved the use of hand-held drills for about 20-30 minutes in each session. The drill, inevitably, would transmit vibrations to the wrist.
     The wrist is prone to strain. The structure of the wrist comprises eight small bones, allowing it to be flexible. But sprain can easily occur, as typists and tennis players well know. The symptoms are pain, numbness and swelling. Repeated over-exertion might result in carpal tunnel syndrome and triangular fibrocartilage tear. These are very serious conditions.

Work at North District Hospital
In September 1998 the plaintiff was posted to work as a dental officer in the dental unit of North District Hospital (NDH): a newly opened hospital. The dental unit had only two dentists – the plaintiff and Dr Tsui, her supervisor.
     Prior to working in NDH the plaintiff had no problem with SX. Her patients were well-served by her exercise of skill in surgical extraction operations.
     Her work schedule at NDH was gruelling. Her appointment book was marked three months in advance. The number of SX required of her was far greater than that of Dr Tsui. Between October 1998 to September 1999 she performed 710 SX. Over the same period Dr Tsui did 479 SX.
    Her work in NDH over a period of 13 months resulted in her developing carpal tunnel syndrome and triangular fibrocartilege tear. This eventually ended her career as a dentist.

The legal proceedings
On 2 September 2002 the plaintiff issued a writ seeking damages against the government. It was not until 14 years later that the action was heard in court. That took place in December 2016 and March 2017. Judgment was delivered in April 2019. The judge found that the department had failed to maintain a safe and healthy workplace and had breached its duty of care to the plaintiff. She was awarded substantial damages and costs.

The findings of fact
The plaintiff first developed symptoms in her right hand and wrist in mid-1999. This was known to Dr Tsui who had monitored closely her appointments. As the judge found, a reasonable and prudent employer had the duty to consider the plaintiff’s capabilities and condition, and adjust her duties particularly as regards SX. Those capabilities had, of course, a direct impact on her patients’ welfare. Because the dental unit was so short-staffed and the demands of the patients so pressing, there was no real choice that her SX might have been lessened.
     From July 1999 the plaintiff wore a hand splint and sought medical and physiotherapy treatment. Her work schedule did not diminish. In October she took three weeks’ sick leave and returned to work on 25 October, with the symptoms only partially relieved. Dr Tsui made no inquiry of her condition and put her back onto the same gruelling schedule. Things came to a head on 30 October (a Saturday) when she was given three SX to perform. On the third SX she suffered excruciating pain in her right wrist and could not continue the operation (to the distress of her patient, of course). She was later diagnosed to have suffered carpal tunnel syndrome and a tear to the triangular fibrocartilage complex which effectively ended her career as a dentist.
     The judge found as a fact that, on the plaintiff’s return from sick leave, Dr Tsui told her he would not change her schedule; complaints from her would not have resulted in her rescheduling; and, in particular, the 3 SX fixed for 30 October. It would seem that Dr Tsui himself was under pressure. The fault was in the heartless system of the department which was interested in numbers and not in the welfare of people under its care.
     It was on these facts that the trial judge found for the plaintiff. What civilised legal system in the world would not have arrived at the same conclusion? And, it might be added, what caring public health provider in the world would not have felt sympathy for the plaintiff, accepted responsibility for the incident and moved on? Not the Hong Kong Department of Health.

Appeal
The Health Department launched an appeal, dealt with by the Court of Appeal (CA) by its judgment of 8 March 2021, comprehensively reviewing the judge’s findings and affirming his conclusions.

Application for leave to further appeal
On 7 April 2021 the department sought leave from the CA to take the matter to the Court of Final Appeal. The CA determined the matter a year later on paper, by its ruling of 20 May 2022.
     This is a 22-page document where the CA comprehensively disposed of the eight purported questions for the CFA’s consideration. They were all dismissed. The CA rejected the application for leave to appeal in its entirety.
     Beneath its dignified language, one can sense boiling outrage rightly felt by the CA. The trial judge, three years earlier, had made clear findings of fact, putting an end to litigation which started in 2002. The fact that the department had grievously failed to discharge its duty of care to the plaintiff could hardly be in doubt. The CA had affirmed those findings. And yet the Health Department was not satisfied; it wanted lawyers to engage in a point-scoring nit-picking forensic game to deprive the plaintiff of redress, as if the health and well-being of Yeung Lai Ying were of no account; it wanted the plaintiff back in the grinding forensic machine to face further delay and anxiety. Having been responsible for damaging the plaintiff’s health, ending her dental career, it cared not whether further proceedings might not damage her mental health as well.

The eight questions
The eight questions were farcical. Question 1 was a pure pleading point which no modern judge would for a moment entertain. Question 2 was this:
“Whether factual findings on the nature of injury suffered by a plaintiff employee, and causation between such injury and the alleged breach of duty committed by the defendant employer, may be made by resorting to ‘common sense’ to fill a gap not covered by the medical evidence, when the medical experts have not been asked to give an opinion on those issues?”
Common sense indeed. What is singularly missing is common sense in the department’s whole approach; common sense and compassion. The following six questions simply piled absurdity on absurdity and bear no examination.

Conclusion
The time limit for the department to seek leave from the Appeal Committee to take the matter to the CFA has yet to expire. Is it conceivable that the department would take this inhumane step? Is this trial by ordeal starting in 2002 not long enough?
     The Minister for Food and Health bears ultimate responsibility for the department. Is she aware of this outrage?

Friday, July 16, 2021

Victor W T Li & Trevor T W Wan (current Gov & Law) on COVID-19 Control and Preventive Measures: a Medico-Legal Analysis (Hong Kong Medical Journal)

Victor W T Li & Trevor T W Wan (currently in HKU Gov & Law programme)
Hong Kong Medical Journal
Published on 11 June 2021
Introduction: The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has compelled governments around the world to deploy preventive and control measures of unprecedented stringency and scale. In Hong Kong, the Chief Executive-in-Council has invoked extensive powers under Section 8 of the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance (Cap 599) and adopted a series of subsidiary regulations in an attempt to control the spread of COVID-19.

Thursday, March 11, 2021

Angela Zhang: China is Leaning into Antitrust Regulation to Stay Competitive with the US (Fortune)

Published on 9 Feb 2021
Introduction: The Ant Group is planning a major revamp in response to pressure from Chinese financial regulators, just three months after Jack Ma’s outspoken remarks against them. New antitrust rules concerning tech firms went into effect on Sunday. While Ma’s critical speech may have been the tipping point for the government to rein in Big Tech, there have been long-standing economic, social, and industrial policy issues that merit the government’s action. In fact, Beijing’s recent efforts to strengthen antitrust regulation in the tech sector are motivated by a larger goal: to become a technology superpower and achieve self-sufficiency so that China no longer needs to rely on the West... Click here to read the full text.

Monday, December 28, 2020

Young, Hayward & Ip on Showing Arrested Youth Some Mercy, to begin the Healing Process in Hong Kong (SCMP)

Simon Young, William Hayward, and Paul Ip
2 December 2020 
The social unrest in Hong Kong since June 2019 has been heartbreaking. The scale of disruption and violence is unprecedented. People were harassed or attacked simply over the colour of their clothing. The verbal and emotional abuse arising from supporting the government or taking part in peaceful protest has been disturbing for all.
     The civil behaviour and good order that has characterised Hong Kong for generations seemed to disappear overnight. Road blocks, tear gas and confrontation between demonstrators and police became part of the lifestyle of the city during that period.
      There are many concerns in the community about the enactment of the national security law and its impact on many of Hong Kong’s freedoms. At least some of the violent confrontations have subsided for the moment, but the roots of the problems that led to them have not been addressed. Genuine reconciliation within society needs to occur, otherwise further social unrest might come back at any time.
      The local and central governments have a responsibility to lead in this process given their position of power. Such actions would be for the good of everyone in Hong Kong. One place to start is in resolving the status of those who were arrested... Click here to read the full text. 

Monday, December 21, 2020

Richard Cullen on Reforming LegCo Rules of Procedure to Ensure Meaningful Debates (China Daily)

21 December 2020
A recent striking change in Hong Kong’s TV programming is the transformation of Legislative Council broadcasts. Where previously we tuned in to recurring episodes of “clown hall” we now find ourselves viewing comparatively calm and serious discussion. Gone are the unbecoming stunts of fruit and paper throwing and political posturing, interspersed with rowdy pushing and shoving, including instances of brazen physical intimidation: More boring, yes, but a welcome switch and a return to normalcy.
     But we have also lost realistic counter-arguments from opposition members in the LegCo chamber. These were often fiery and sometimes knee-jerk but they could shine a sharp light when the opposition chose to engage in serious debate. Almost all those members have now gone, following the four members who were disqualified out the door. Opposition politicians have repeatedly allowed fervor to take over from good sense. They have done so again with this walkout.
     In fact, we need to see a return of robust debates once the delayed LegCo elections are held. We do not, however, need a return to the juvenile continuous disruptions and gratuitous hostilities that marked LegCo as the most dysfunctional governance institution in the HKSAR over the last decade... Click here to read the full text.

Sunday, December 20, 2020

Patricia Ho Sounds Alarm Bells with Hong Kong's Immigration (Amendment) Bill 2020

Patricia Ho examines the immigration amendment bill, which was gazetted on 4 December 2020, and outlines the potential harmful consequences for those seeking asylum in Hong Kong

Alarm Bells Rung by the Immigration (Amendment) Bill 2020

The Immigration (Amendment) Bill 2020 ("Bill") was recently published with the aim to improve the efficiency of the screening procedures of non-refoulement claims and introduce enhanced measures in respect of law enforcement and detention of asylum seekers. It seeks to tackle problems such as unlawful employment and “delaying tactics” adopted by asylum seekers. However, the proposed amendments have drawn criticisms from civil society concerned with the human rights of this vulnerable population. Upon an initial review of the Bill, it seems likely that some of the proposed amendments contravene the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and leading jurisprudence in this space, let alone international treaty obligations. More generally, it sends a message the authorities are taking a hostile approach in devising policies and laws regarding asylum seekers. 
     Let us first have a look at the proposed procedural reforms of the screening mechanism. It is known the success rates of the screening performed by the Immigration Department is strikingly low. Multiple judicial reviews highlighting faulty decisions have brought to light the poor quality of decisions. This background makes it a concern that proposed amendments place a heavy onus on the claimant to lodge all their evidence relating to the claim within 7 days after they file their appeal. Claimants only have 14 days to lodge their appeals during which many have to look for legal representation which can be a difficult process. Many may depend on the help of pro bono counsel or NGOs who do not usually have the resources to do this work speedily. On appeals, many claimants will try to obtain expert evidence which will require more time. It will be a serious fault in the process if claimants are unable to submit expert evidence owing to this restriction. Another small but notable procedural change is that claimants will not be considered to have lodged an appeal if there are minor procedural inadequacies in their appeal forms such as a failure to sign their name. This unreasonable emphasis on formality, expressly allowing no exceptions, is particularly unsuitable for an often vulnerable group of claimants. 
     The most disconcerting procedural reform is the proposed permission given to immigration officers and appeal board adjudicators to require a claimant to go through with their proceedings in a language other than the one they requested so long as they “reasonably consider” that the claimant or the witness “is able to understand and communicate in it”. No guidance is given to how officers or adjudicators may reach such conclusions, so one must question how they can do so when they would presumably not be able to communicate with the claimants in the first place. This seems to create a broad range of possible procedural unfairness, which surely will defeat the Immigration Department’s agenda to streamline the process when their processes can prima facie be amenable to judicial review. 
     Perhaps the most problematic part of the proposed reforms lies in the strengthening of the basis for immigration detention. The Bill allows factors such as “number of persons pending removal from Hong Kong”, and “manpower and resources constraints” to be taken into account when deciding whether the period of detention is lawful. It intentionally prolongs detention based on administrative and bureaucratic inefficiency. This obviously contravenes the Hardial Singh principles which stressed that the period of detention is only justified for a reasonable period, which is a matter to be determined by courts. The authorities must act with reasonable diligence and expedition to effect removal (one must query why they do not focus reforms on the efficiency of the administration). The proposals contravene the clear and established principle that immigration detention must be applied as an exceptional measure of last resort, for the shortest period, and only if justified by legitimate purpose. 
     An issue that raises the loudest alarm is the arming of officers at the Castle Peak Bay Immigration Center (“CIC”). The Bill authorizes immigration officers to possess firearms and offensive weapons including pepper spray, steel batons and baton guns without prior consent from the Commissioner of Police. Bearing in mind that immigration detention is an administrative function, not a penal one, this development reinforces the portrayal of refugees and asylum seekers as ‘criminals’. There are already reports exposing the use of punitive solitary confinement and strip searches in CIC. With the lack of an effective complaints and monitoring system, the chance of disproportionate use of force and abuse is further escalated. At the root of this escalation of hostility is the fact that CIC is manned by the Immigration Department and not the Correctional Services Department. There is an issue that the party seeking to remove individuals detained is the same as the one imposing detention terms and conditions. This conflict of interest should be addressed. 
     The above is by no means an exhaustive list of the proposed amendments or the potential problems arising from them. It is hoped in the coming months some meaningful debate will ensue in the Legislative Council that will lead the government to take into account the concerns of civil society and reconsider their proposals. 
     One would not normally take issue with reforms to streamline or speed up an assessment system for refugees; however, if the means to achieve this aim will strip the basic protections of the rights of claimants then the legal community at large should be concerned. Reforms to improve efficiency in this regard must always be in line with the high standards of fairness set down by our courts, reflecting those set out in international instruments. 

Tuesday, December 8, 2020

Do Judges Run Prisons? (Henry Litton)

DO JUDGES RUN PRISONS? 
Henry Litton

The Scenario
In Hong Kong there are male prisons, and there are female prisons. There are no mixed prisons. The disciplinary regime in each is different, for obvious reasons.

The Disciplinary Rules
As regards hair style, this is what the Prison Rule says about male prisoners:
The hair of all male convicted prisoners will be kept cut sufficiently close, but not close cropped, for the purpose of health and cleanliness, unless the prisoner himself requests it”. 
But for female prisoners it is different. The rule says:
Upon request, female prisoners will have their hair cut especially before discharge or production in court. Except as recommended by MO [Medical Officer] a female prisoner’s hair shall not be cut shorter than the style on admission without her consent.” 
These two rules are set out in the Standing Orders for prisons, but grouped together in SO 41-05. However presented, they are clearly different rules.
      Another Prison Rule requires the Chief Officer to ensure that male prisoners’ clothing is kept in a good state of repair, and “their hair kept trimmed, and their washing, hair clipping and personal ablution attended to”. 
     Then Prison Rule 34, regarding general treatment of all prisoners, says:
Every prisoner shall obey such directions as regards washing, bathing, shaving and hair cutting as may from time to time be prescribed”. 
The “Long Hair” case
In March 2012 Leung Kwok Hung (also known as “Long Hair”) was convicted before a magistrate of criminal charges. In June 2014, after an appeal, he was required to serve a sentence of four weeks imprisonment. This he did at the Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre. On admission he objected to having his hair cut short and said he might apply for judicial review to challenge such requirement. After ascertaining that no application had been made, the Chief Officer authorized the hair-cutting to proceed. That was done. 
     Leung subsequently did apply for leave to start judicial review proceedings: Hence the case Leung Kwok Hung aka “Long Hair” v Commissioner for Correctional Services [HCAL 109/2014] heard by Au J in April and May 2015.
     In a 39-page judgment handed down 1.5 years later, he made the following orders:
(1) A declaration that the rule for male prisoners constituted “direct sex discrimination under s.5 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and was made unlawful under s.38(1) of the Ordinance; or alternatively the rule violated Article 25 of the Basic Law and was unlawful”. 
(2) An order to quash the Chief Officer’s decision to enforce the rule.
Statutory Offence 
The offence of sex discrimination is a pure creature of statute. The common law knew nothing of such offence.
     Before WWII, there was not a single female judge on the Bench anywhere in England. The common law gave no redress for sex discrimination. It was not the common law judges but legislators who, bit by bit, came to realize that this was an ethical issue.
     It follows, as night follows day, that the ingredients of such offence are to be found in the statute itself. Nowhere else.
     The Hong Kong Sex Discrimination Ordinance was first enacted in May 1996. Its long title says that it is an Ordinance to render unlawful “certain kinds of sex discrimination ….”. There then follows many different kinds of discrimination. For example:
  • Discrimination by way of victimization: s. 9
  • Discrimination by employers against contract workers: s. 13
  • Discrimination by barristers: s. 36.
  • Governmental discrimination: s.38(1).
Section 5(1)(a) 
Here, the judge held that the rule concerning male hair-style in prison was what he called “direct discrimination”, as defined in s.5(1)(a). That section, taken together with s. 6 and s.38(1) reads thus:
'The Commissioner discriminates against a man in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Ordinance if, on the ground of his sex, he treats him less favourably than he treats a woman' 
Note the words: “in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Ordinance”. 
     The statutory 'purpose' in this case is the prohibition in s.38(1) which makes it unlawful for the government, in the exercise of its functions, to discriminate against Leung Kwok Hung.
     But what were the relevant circumstances? They were those in a male prison. The prison regime relevant in a male prison does not apply in a female prison, for obvious reasons. And vice-versa. In judging whether s.5(1)(a) is engaged in a case concerning male prisoners, comparison with circumstances in a female prison is not relevant.
     If there be any doubt about this, it would be dispelled by s.10 which says:
A comparison of the cases of different sex under s. 5(1) ….shall be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially different, in the other.” 
     Any ordinary person, not learned in the law, would have found this a matter of plain common sense. In life, there is no ethical framework that transcends context. Ethical values are not free-standing. When someone says: 'This is sex discrimination', that statement has no meaning unless you know the context in which it is said.
     The Sex Discrimination Ordinance was simply not engaged in this case. End of story.

How Did the Judge Get To The Result He Did? 
The judge identified “three types of discrimination”: Direct, indirect and Thlimmenos discrimination. These are labels used in overseas case law. The term Thlimminos discrimination came from a case of that name decided in the European Court of Human Rights.  The expression “direct discrimination” identified the kind of discrimination set out in s. 5(1)(a). 
     Au J, instead of focussing on the words in the Hong Kong statute, got totally entangled in overseas case law concerning “direct discrimination”, as if this was a generic term detached from its statutory roots. He never focussed on the simple words in s.5(1)(a).
     Before Au J, the exercise in court seemed like a running dialogue between Bench and Bar, with case after case being dissected and discussed.
     For instance in para. 56 of his judgment one finds this sentence:
The Gillan Case therefore does not support Mr Pao’s submissions questioning the correctness of the Roma Case.” 
Mr Pao was counsel for the Commissioner. Why was he questioning the correctness of the Roma Case ? Right or wrong, what purpose did that serve? 
     The running dialogue on these two cases began in para.44 of the judgment where the facts of the Roma Case were set out. They involved immigration control at the Prague airport for those seeking entry into the UK. The Gillan Case concerned police powers of stop and search in the UK. How these cases elucidated the meaning of the Hong Kong statute on sex discrimination was not explained.
     After the conclusion on those two cases reached in para 56, one sees many more paragraphs in the judgment where other overseas cases were discussed, ending with para 98:
For all the above reasons, I reject the Commissioner’s arguments and conclude that SO 41-05 and the Decision amount to direct sex discrimination and are thus unlawful”.
The “above reasons” were set out in about 20 pages of fine print. Few can understand them, however elevated their level of English.

The Common Man’s Perspective 
Overseas case law would be a complete mystery to the ordinary citizen.  But if one simply focussed attention on the words “circumstances relevant for the purposes ….of this Ordinance”, that would have coincided with the way an ordinary person would have approached the matter. The question of discrimination would have been put in the right context: That is to say, custodial discipline in a male prison.
     The common man would have said: 'what is the fuss all about? Are you saying that the female rules should apply in a male prison ?' And he might even have added: 'Are the judges now going to run prisons as well?'
     Furthermore, the ordinary person would not have agonized over whether, under the rules, a male inmate was being treated “less favourably” than a female inmate. He would have realized that the matter was one of custodial discipline, within the Commissioner’s responsibilities; uniformity and conformity among inmates was important as part of the correctional process. But females were not the inmates under consideration.
     Adopting such an approach the judgment would not have been more than a couple of pages long and would have been easily understood by the ordinary citizen. 

Article 25 Basic Law
As regards whether the rule concerning prison hair-style offended Article 25 of the Basic Law, the ordinary man would have shaken his head in total disbelief at the judge’s conclusion.
     Article 25 simply says: “All Hong Kong residents shall be equal before the law”. Full stop.  The notion that, under the principle of One Country Two Systems, Article 25 of the Basic Law could be engaged in a case like this is alarming.
     The Basic Law is a constitutional document, setting out the general framework for the Region. It is not a civil code for regulating Hong Kong’s daily affairs: And certainly not for regulating the way prisons should be run.

The Court of Appeal 
The Commissioner appealed. The Court of Appeal gave judgment in April 2018.
      The Chief Judge did not write the leading judgment. This was left to Lam VP. But the Chief Judge did set the tone. He began his judgment by saying:
Discrimination is a huge subject that has generated a tremendous amount of literature and debate. It straddles many disciplines and law is just one of them.” 
With such an approach it was inevitable that the judgments amounted to pages and pages of fine print, totally unintelligible to the ordinary person.
     As it was, the Court of Appeal, after tripping through many of the same cases as the judge, came to the opposite conclusion: that Au J had erred on both counts: that is to say, the application of s.5(1)(a) to the facts of the case, and his reliance on Article 25 of the Basic Law.  Au J’s judgment was quashed.

Court of Final Appeal
Leung Kwok Hung in turn lodged an appeal. This was heard by the Court of Final Appeal ( CFA ) in October 2020. Its judgment handed down on 27 November 2020 must have shocked the community. It overturned the Court of Appeal’s judgment. Au J’s judgment was restored.
     The Chief Justice delivered the only judgment, with which the other four judges agreed.  He began his judgment by saying that a “4-step approach contained in the speech of Baroness Hale of Richmond in R (European Roma Rights v The Prague Immigration Office [2005 ] 2 AC 1 at para 73 is helpful”. 
     That immediately raises the question: “Helpful” as to what? Is the wording in s.5(1)(a) not clear enough? At any rate, these are the 4-steps.

“4-Step Approach” 
“15 (1) There must be a difference in treatment between one person ……and another person, real or hypothetical, from a different sex group, the compared person ( in our case, female prisoners ).

(2) The relevant circumstances between the complainant and the compared person are the same or at least not materially different.

(3) It must then be shown that the treatment given to the complainant is less favourable than that given to the compared person.

(4) The difference in treatment is on the basis of sex.”
      As to 15(1), the Chief Justice said that male prisoners did not “have the choice as regards hair-style that female prisoners had”, which of course is right.

The Relevant Circumstances” 
As to 15(2), the Chief Justice said: “…it is important to compare like with like and to view the matter in proper context”. That again is correct, and one would have expected the judgment then to examine the question: What is the proper context ? Is the court being asked to compare like with like ?
     But not at all. The judgment immediately moved on to 15(3): What constitutes “less favourable treatment”.

Less Favourable Treatment
There then followed 11 pages of text examining a whole range of overseas cases dealing with a variety of situations: Selection requirements for secondary schools Birmingham City Council v Equal Opportunities Commission; length of hair in schools Re McMillan; rub down searches in prisons R ( on the Application of James Dowell v Secretary of State for Justice and Conway v Canada; dress and appearance code in a supermarket Smith v Safeway; what constitutes presenting a clean and tidy appearance and to dress in a business-like way in a book shop Department for Works and Pensions v Thompson.
      Those eleven pages were under the heading “Less favourable treatment”. Whether someone has been treated “equally” or “less favourably” can only be examined in the actual context of the case. It is not an abstract exercise. A hundred citations of cases dealing with different situations will yield no answer.  What is more, “equality”, “less favourable treatment” are elusive concepts.
     One argument put up on the Commissioner’s behalf was this: the requirement imposed on Leung Kwok Hung was no more than the conventional hair-style of the majority of males in Hong Kong. That requirement was uniformly applied in a male prison: to de-emphasise individuality In the interests of custodial discipline. That is plain common sense.
     But, whilst accepting the need for custodial discipline, the Chief Justice, astonishingly, said this in para 52:
….no details are provided and no basis is given for saying that in our society, the conventional hairstyle for men is a short one whereas for women hair can be long or short. There must be sufficient evidence going to these matters; they cannot simply be asserted ….
Sadly, the court appears to dwell in a world of words, detached from reality on the ground.
     In the Chief Justice’s view, the “less favourable treatment” rested on the fact that a female prisoner, on admission, was allowed to keep her hairstyle even if it was long, whereas a male could not. But factually, the Chief Justice was not entirely correct. The female was also under some limitation. Her choice was not unrestrained. If the Medical Office required her hair to be cut, then under the Prison Rules she had to comply.
     In the two courts below, the judges looked at the concept of “less favourable treatment” through the lens of cases dealing with a diversity of situations and came to opposite conclusions. The reason why it is so difficult to nail down that concept is because the context in which it was being considered was missing. 
     The Commissioner was the respondent to these judicial review proceedings. Were he to be asked: 'what is this case all about', his reply would surely have been 'about custodial discipline in a male prison'.
     In this context, the problem of “less favourable treatment” disappears. The comparison with the female regime was simply not relevant.

Article 25 of the Basic Law 
In para 56 the judgment said this:
In view of the conclusion reached on the previous issue, it is unnecessary to deal with this issue. However, on the facts of the present case, the outcome would not be different under Article 25 of the Basic Law.
This seemingly throwaway line contains a most sinister seed.
     What the Chief Justice was saying, in effect, was this: Were the challenge to the prison rule to be judged, not by applying the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, but by applying Article 25 of the Basic Law, the result would have been the same.
     In other words, he would have interpreted Article 25 of the Basic Law as applicable to strike down the prison rule: raising, in effect, a purely local matter to the State level. This was an open invitation to lawyers to play games with the Basic Law, regardless of the consequences.

Transparency 
The Chief Justice, in answer to general criticisms of the Judiciary, issued a statement on 23 September in which he said (para 29):
The community is able to see for itself and verify whether fundamental principles are followed by the courts by observing court proceedings ………and reading the judgments of the courts at all levels to see precisely the reasons why a court has arrived at a determination …..Open justice and transparency enable the community to observe the judicial process in full, and to provide meaningful and informed comments and criticisms”. 
Unhappily, this judgment is anything but transparent.
     It deals essentially with an ethical issue, made into an offence by a local statute. Any judgment on such an issue should be understood by every educated person. Yet this judgment, and those in the courts below, are so dense with “law” that no-one can possibly understand them, however elevated their standard of English.

Limits of Courts’ Powers 
In a case such as this, which essentially concerns management of male prisons, a court should approach the matter with hesitancy and diffidence. The Commissioner has expertise which judges do not share. The standards of behaviour are set by the Commissioner. Such standards fall naturally within a broad spectrum. If judges expect the community to respect the norms and values set by them, they in turn must show respect for those set by other institutions of government. Judges have no monopoly on ethical standards set in society.

What has this judgment achieved? 
The undoubted effect of the CFA’s judgment is that discipline in male prisons must now be relaxed as regards hairstyle. There will be repercussions. What follow-on impact this might have on custodial discipline as a whole seems of no concern to the CFA.
      What Au J had before him was a mere application for leave to start proceedings for judicial review. Au J was in the position of a gate-keeper. Judicial review is brought in the interests of lawful administration, good governance. It is, at the end of the day, a discretionary remedy. 
      The application was made some time after Leung had served his sentence. It might even be the case that his hair had grown back to its full length by that time. Was it made in good faith ? What interests of his did it serve?  Did it help good administration in male prisons to have the hairstyle rule struck down by the court?

A Leadership Role?
Had the CFA been conscious of its leadership role in the community, these would have been matters of concern to the court. But the court gave the procedural aspects of the case not an ounce of thought. It simply played to the agenda laid down by counsel.

Eurocentric View 
And what is perhaps even more troubling is the Eurocentric leaning of the judgments. Instead of giving the words in a local statute their plain ordinary meaning and applying those words to the facts of the case in a robust straightforward way, the courts favoured the formulation of vague principles.
     The judges, at all three levels of the courts, seem drawn to overseas case law as moths to naked light: apparently brushing aside the inconvenient truth that the common law system operates under the principle of One Country Two Systems. Such mindset spells disaster in the long run. This is not a formula for the long continuation of the common law. 
 

Wednesday, October 28, 2020

HKU Law Faculty Perspectives on Separation of Powers in Hong Kong

Hong Kong Free Press 
26 September 2020
Chief Executive Carrie Lam and her administration insist that Hong Kong has an “executive-led” system of government, with no formal separation of powers between the executive, the judiciary and the legislature. This seems directly to contradict statements by successive chief justices about guarantees of judicial independence under the doctrine of separate powers.
     The issue at the crux of the debate is whether Hong Kong’s system is founded on a common law principle which provides safeguards against the abuse of power. Given the uncertainties surrounding the national security law, there are concerns that Lam’s administration is weakening the checks and balances that guarantee judicial independence and the rule of law...
What legal scholars say
Albert Chen, a professor of constitutional law, told HKFP that the debate was merely an issue of interpretation and description, deferring to the statements from Beijing as the appropriate description of the Hong Kong system.
Hong Kong and Chinese government officials reject the [Chinese term for the separation of powers] mainly because it is considered to be inconsistent with the [Chinese term for an executive-led system], which they believe to be the accurate description of the nature of the HKSAR political system.
     However, he said there is no inconsistency between the separation of powers and an executive-led system, and he does not think the government’s comments “will change the way in which courts apply the doctrine of separation of powers in the future.“
     Another constitutional law expert, Professor Johannes Chan, told HKFP it goes deeper than a matter of description:
It is true that there is a different understanding between Hong Kong and the Mainland on separation of powers, but this is more than a matter of interpretation. The understanding will affect how one sees the development of the system.
      He also raised concerns that the government interprets “executive-led” to mean that it can override the courts. “It begs the question of what is executive-led… if it means that the executive prevails over the judiciary or that the Chief Executive is above the law, that is something to be worried [about].” 
     Chan also said that the separation of powers does not touch on the question of sovereignty. “No one says that [the separation of powers] would allow Hong Kong to usurp power that is beyond its autonomy. For powers that are within its autonomy, there is nothing wrong about separation of powers among the three branches, in that each has its own constitutional role and there are checks and balances.“
This has nothing to do with the sovereign power. Nor is it inconsistent with the power coming from the sovereign. But if the objection is that the sovereign has power over the judiciary and the judiciary is expected to be a compliant judiciary, that is of course not our understanding and contrary to what the Basic Law has provided for."
David Law
Published in September 2020
(Editor's note: The following is an excerpt of written response by Professor David Law on recent remark by Chief Executive Carrie Lam, who rejected the notion of separation of powers...)
It does sound like Carrie Lam is deeply confused or deeply mistaken. The allocation of power between national and subnational governments is *not* the same as “separation of powers”. 
     "Separation of powers” traditionally refers to the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and/or judicial branches. In this sense, the concept dates back to Montesquieu. A parliamentary system has only a bipartite (two-part) separation of powers, between the legislative and executive (which are combined together, because the Prime Minister and Cabinet are executive but also sit in the legislature) and the judiciary, which is separate.
    In other words, separation of powers is a horizontal relationship, among equal institutions that perform different functions.
    But the relationship between Beijing and HKSAR is a vertical relationship, between a government that rules over broader territory, and a government that rules over narrower territory.
   That is about dividing power on the basis of geography (national vs subnational) and subject matter (e.g. education, environmental protection, immigration), not on the basis of functions (executive, legislative, judicial). So we do not call it “separation of powers”. Click here to read the full text. 

"Separation of Powers"
By Danny Gittings (PhD candidate)
It is one of the most often cited passages from Sir Anthony’s Mason’s extensive extra-judicial writings during his 18 years as a non-permanent judge on the Court of Final Appeal. An extract from a 2007 Hong Kong Law Journal article in which Mason cautioned that, while the Hong Kong Basic Law clearly “incorporates a separation of powers”, this is one of a number of areas where comparative law needs to be treated with great care[1]—since the exact form in which separation of powers applies will inevitably vary from one jurisdiction to another—was, for a decade after it was written, regularly cited in Hong Kong court judgments relating to the doctrine.[2]
     Last week that same passage, which had been previously cited by Ms Teresa Cheng in 2011 while sitting as a deputy High Court,[3] was used once again by the now Secretary for Justice in the very different context of a strongly worded newspaper article which argued that the “doctrine has no place in the political structure of Hong Kong” and used language such as “desperate” and “pathetic” to disparage those who disagree with her.[4] Mason’s specific caution, which only ever mentioned avoiding the direct incorporation of foreign case law in this area and never suggested such judgments could not be more selectively cited (as Cheng, in fact, did in her 2011 judgment)[5], was twisted into a much more general warning that the doctrine as a whole “must be treated with great care in its application in Hong Kong”, wording which seemed to imply that both Mason and the judges who cited this extract had doubts about whether the doctrine applies under the Hong Kong Basic Law at all.
     Since this extract from Mason’s 2007 article has been interpreted so greatly out of context, it might be helpful briefly to revisit the context in which it was originally written. Separation of powers is not, and has never been, since at least the 18th century, the pure system set out in the leading textbook definition by MJC Vile that Cheng’s newspaper article cited to buttress her argument that Hong Kong does not have any version of the doctrine at all. From reading that text, the Secretary would know that Vile only offered this pure definition as a “benchmark” against which to judge the less extreme versions of separation of powers practiced, in various forms, in most jurisdictions around the world.[6] That point was somewhat overlooked in a handful of early court judgments on separation of powers under the Hong Kong Basic Law, which came rather too close to adopting a pure version of the doctrine,[7] in one case citing from a formalist Australian precedent which Mason himself had previously criticised.[8]  Mason’s cautions on this point, which began a few months after one of these formalist judgments,[9] are best understood as friendly advice from someone experienced in ruling on separation of powers issues on the need for the SAR to carve out its own distinctive version of separation of powers, just as other jurisdictions the world over have done.
     That advice was heeded in subsequent judgments, and it must be open to doubt if Mason would feel any need to repeat the same caution today. During the second decade of the SAR, the courts carved out what Cheung J (as he then was) described as a “flexible and realistic, as opposed to an idealistic approach to the doctrine of separation of powers”[10], which recognises that the precise manner in which separation of powers is applied must be adapted to suit Hong Kong’s specific circumstances, just as it is in almost every jurisdiction in the world.[11] That means a court's application of a localised version of the doctrine is a far cry from the wholesale adoption of a western political system that appears to have been the real target of Deng Xiaoping’s 1987 warning which, although he only briefly mentioned separation of powers in passing (and inaccurately referred to the existence of an “American parliamentary system”) continues to be resurrected every time there is a fresh debate over the existence of separation of powers under the Hong Kong Basic Law.[12]
     Had the Secretary confined herself simply to pointing out Hong Kong’s system is far from a “pure” system of separation of powers—as one mainland scholar did last week[13]—she could have provided a useful contribution to the current debate over the issue. But an article that uses language like “desperate” and “pathetic” to disparage those who disagree with her hardly falls into that category.

Danny Gittings is completing a PhD on separation of powers at the Faculty of Law.

[1] Sir Anthony Mason, “The Place of Comparative Law in the Developing Jurisprudence on the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong” (2007) 37 HKLJ 299, 305.

[2] Luk Ka Cheung v Market Misconduct Tribunal [2009] 1 HKLRD 114, 130, Re Easy Concepts International Holdings Ltd [2011] 6 HKC 391, 407, Koon Wing Yee v Financial Secretary [2013] 1 HKLRD 76, 93 and Chief Executive of the HKSAR v President of the Legislative Council [2016] 6 HKC 417, 434.

[3] Re Easy Concepts at 407.

[4] Teresa Cheng, “Why separation of powers has no place in Hong Kong’s political structure”, South China Morning Post, 9 Sept. 2020.

[5] Deputy High Court Judge Cheng’s judgment made reference to four Australian, and one US, decisions on the meaning of judicial power.

[6] MJC Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2nd ed., 1998) at page 14.

[7] See Danny Gittings, “Separation of Powers in Hong Kong: Inching Towards a More Flexible Judicial Interpretation” (2019) 49(1) HKLJ  1, 11-13.

[8] Lau Kwok Fai v Secretary for Justice (unrep., HCAL 177 and 180/2002, [2003] HKEC 711) at para. 19, citing from R v Kirby, ex p Boilermaker’s Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, an Australian judgment which has been widely criticized, including in Sir Anthony Mason, “A New Perspective on Separation of Powers” (1996) 82 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration 1, 5.

[9] In the inaugural lecture of the Common Law Lecture Series on 18 March 2005, three months after a highly formalist judgment in Re Chu Wai Ha [2005] 2 HKC 36. See Gittings (n7) at 14.

[10] Luk Ka Cheung at 134.

[11] Gittings (see n7) at 14-17

[12] Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at a Meeting with the Members of the Committee for Drafting the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”, 16 April 1987 in Deng Xiaoping on the Question of Hong Kong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1993) at page 55

[13] Zhu Zheng, “Separation of powers in Hong Kong: Yes or no?”, CGTN, 10 Sept. 2020.

Wednesday, August 12, 2020

Hualing Fu on the Relationship Between Hong Kong's Basic Law and the National Security Law

A Note on the Basic Law and the National Security Law
12 August 2020

Is the National Security Law (NSL) a second Basic Law standing on its own in its relationship with the Basic Law or is it part of the Basic Law structure and subject to its control? This is a difficult question. This note considers the arguments in favour of both positions and inclines towards the latter view as the better understanding of the relationship between the NSL and the Basic Law.

Legislative Hierarchy and Principles
The constitutional rules and principles in relation to the legislature of the mainland are most clearly stated in the Legislation Law. Article 7 of this Law provides that the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee (NPCSC) have the exclusive power to make laws.
     The NPC makes and amends criminal law, civil law, laws relating to state organs and other “basic laws”, which remains an undefined and controversial concept in Chinese law.
     The NPCSC makes and amends laws other than the basic laws. The NPCSC also has the power to make laws to partially supplement and amend the NPC laws (e.g. basic laws) when the NPC is not in session, but any addition and amendment shall not contravene the “basic principles” of the “basic laws”. [1]
     According to Article 97(1) of the same law, the NPC has the power to change or rescind laws made by the NPCSC that are “inappropriate.” [2]
     Notwithstanding these legislative rules, the Chinese Constitution does not provide a functional mechanism for constitutional review. The NPCSC occupies the commanding heights of the legislature and has the power both to make law and interpret law, rendering meaningless the possibility of post-enactment constitutional review of law.

The Basic Law
The Basic Law is a basic law in the Chinese hierarchy because it was enacted by the NPC and enjoys a higher constitutional status, albeit in a limited sense. Nevertheless, the Basic Law has a higher constitutional status among all laws in China because of its special function in creating a SAR in the implementation of Article 31 of the Constitution. As a result, the Basic Law is often regarded in Chinese constitutional scholarship as quasi-constitutional or a constitutional document and has been given a privileged constitutional status higher than ordinary NPC laws.
     The April 1990 Decision by the NPC is of special significance in signaling the special constitutional status of the Basic Law. On the same day it promulgated the Basic Law, the NPC made a Decision to affirm and to declare the constitutionality of the Basic Law. The Decision also establishes the supremacy of the Basic Law in the SAR by stating: “The systems, policies and laws to be instituted after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be based on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”[3] The Basic Law constitutes the SAR, and therefore it is Hong Kong’s Constitution, mini or otherwise. Any other law, as long as it is implemented in Hong Kong, would have to be “based on”, subordinate to, and comply with the Basic Law. The NSL, as a NPCSC law, is no exception.

The NSL
The NSL is a unique law, however, which follows an extraordinary law-making path. The NPC itself triggered the legislative process for the NSL through a Decision on 28 May 2020. The Decision relies directly on Article 31 and Article 62 (2) (12) (14) of the Constitution in authorising and mandating the NPCSC to make a NSL within the scope of the Decision. 
     Both the Basic Law and the Decision derive their authority from Article 31. This is also the first time that the NPC has invoked Article 62 (2) to exercise its power in extending a national law to Hong Kong. Article 62 sets out the different functions and powers of the NPC and paragraph (2) refers to the power to “supervise the enforcement of the Constitution”. The making of the NSL relied upon the Constitution for its application to Hong Kong outside of the framework of the Basic Law. This is a significant development in Basic Law jurisprudence and will have long-term consequences. Although the Basic Law is also relied on and referred to in the Decision, no reference is made to any specific articles of the Basic Law, leading to the argument that the NPC has indeed bypassed the Basic Law in making the NSL.
     According to the relevant clauses in Article 62 of the Constitution, the NPC can supervise the implementation of the Constitution (62 (2)); decide on establishment of a SAR and the system to be implemented there (62(14)); and exercise other powers that shall be exercised by the highest organ of state power (62(16)). In acting according to these functions and powers, the NPC is stating, as the sovereign power, it can enact any law for Hong Kong as circumstances demand and as it sees fit.
     On 30 June 2020, the NPCSC promulgated the NSL. Article 3 of the NSL provides that “The Central People’s Government has an overarching responsibility for national security affairs relating to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” By this article, according to my reading of the Basic Law and the NSL, the NPCSC has effectively replaced Article 23 of the Basic Law with the NSL. Or one might say it is giving effect to what has always been implicit in Article 23.
     Article 7 of the NSL provides: “The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall complete, as early as possible, legislation for safeguarding national security as stipulated in the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall refine relevant laws”. This is a technical article used to preempt the challenge that the NSL violates the “on its own” clause in Article 23 of the Basic Law. Given the substantial overlapping between the NSL and Article 23, in form and substance, and common legislative objectives of both laws, a more honest approach is to admit that the NPC has authorised its NPCSC to make an Article 23 law for Hong Kong to fix a potential or real serious national security crisis. The operative word in Article 7 is “complete” suggesting the NPCSC has started the Article 23 work project for Hong Kong to finish.

Conclusion
So what is the constitutional status of the NSL? It has been argued that the NSL is the second Basic Law for Hong Kong because of (A) its direct reliance on, and invocation of Article 31 and Article 62 (2) (12) and (14), and (B) the special authorisation of the NPC to make the NSL through its May Decision. According to this view, the NSL is a national law that exits in parallel to the Basic Law, supplementing and amending the Basic Law but not bound by it. That view, which accepts the creation of a separate source of law and an independent national security regime in Hong Kong outside the Basic Law, would have caused a fundamental change to ‘one country, two systems’. After a careful reading of the NPC Decision, the NSL, and the explanatory notes to both the Decision and the NSL, I cannot find any evidence that such a fundamental change is intended.
     A better view is that the NSL is an ordinary piece of NPCSC legislation, subordinate in status and force to the Basic Law. It is self-evident the NSL, according to the NSL itself (Article 1), was made “in accordance with” the Basic Law. The Basic Law remains a superior law to the NSL and the supreme law in Hong Kong.[4] This is so not merely because the Basic Law is a basic law enacted by the NPC – the NPC can make other basic laws. Rather it is due to the Basic Law’s quasi-constitutional status. The Basic Law remains Hong Kong’s constitution by its nature.
     The NSL is a NPCSC law that has been inserted into Annex III of the Basic Law to fill a gap left by Article 23, as contentious as the matter may be. As such, the NSL has to be consistent with, and accountable to, other provisions of the Basic Law so as to maintain the integrity of the Basic
     Law in accordance with Article 11.[5] The NSL may have replaced the explicit understanding of Article 23 to create a novel national security regime, but it is not immune from the control of the Basic Law.
     From the Chinese law perspective, as stated above, since the NPCSC both made the NSL and interprets both the NSL (Article 65) and the Basic Law (Article 158), a constitutional review of the NSL against the Basic Law by the NPCSC is unlikely to prove a meaningful exercise. However, the Chinese law position does not prohibit Hong Kong courts from developing a common law jurisprudence in interpreting the NSL in accordance with the standards of the Basic Law, that is to say to reconcile any potential conflict between the two laws through judicial interpretation, subject to the interpretative power of the NPCSC. [6]

Notes
[1] Article 7, Legislation Law.
[2] Article 97, Legislation Law.
[3] Decision of the National People’s Congress on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 4 April 1990)
[4] Article 62 of the NSL states that “This Law shall prevail where provisions of the local laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are inconsistent with this Law.” “Local laws” Article 62 does not include the Basic Law.
[5] In the case of HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu and another [1999] HKCFA 10, the CFA considered the constitutionality of the National Flag Ordinance, which was enacted through art 18(2) and Annex III, thereby further confirming that national laws enacted in this way must be consistent with the Basic Law.
[6] Article 65 of the NSL provides “The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress”. Given that the application of the NSL would necessarily involve judicial interpretation by Hong Kong courts, Article 65 must be referring to “ultimate or final power of interpretation”.