Julian Nowag and Anna Tzanaki on The Institutional Framework of the Digital Markets Act: a novel but thoughtful experiment in regulatory design? (Journal of European Competition Law & Practice)

"The institutional framework of the Digital Markets Act: a novel but thoughtful experiment in regulatory design?"
Anna Tzanaki, Julian Nowag
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice
Published online: March 2026

Key Points: 

• By comparison to the enforcement-based model of antitrust that relies on punishment, this article sheds light on the new more complex and hybrid institutional structure of the Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’) that is focused on ‘cooperative’ compliance based on dialogue between regulator and regulated firms and third parties at first instance and leaves the ‘punitive’ model of enforcement as an option of last resort.
• The Commission as the key institutional actor has discretion to escalate or deescalate the process of the DMA’s implementation along this compliance–enforcement continuum through different instruments.
• The central role of the Commission is supported and counterbalanced by a wide array of decentralized institutional actors and procedures, which render the DMA’s institutional architecture less hierarchical and more participatory and flexible.
• The openness in the DMA’s procedural and institutional design effectively complements the closed nature of its substantive obligations imposed on digital gatekeepers.